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NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY FOR THE CRIMINAL
ACTS OF ANOTHER
INTRODUCTION

Society's need to deter crime is spurring a new trend in tort
liability.1 Whether fueled by the recent surge of moralist move2
ments, the general litigious nature of contemporary Americans,
or the self-serving pragmatism generated by human experience, 3 "victims' rights litigation"4 is establishing legal duties in a
1. See generally Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation: A Wave of the
Future?,11 U. RICH. L. REV. 447 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Victims'Rights];
Rottenberg, Crime Victims Fighting Back, PARADE MAGAZINE, Mar. 16, 1980,
at 21; Barbash, Victim's Rights: New Legal Weapon, Washington Post, Dec.

17, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
2. Carrington, Victims' Rights: A New Tort?, TRiAi, June, 1978, at 40
[hereinafter cited as New Tort].
3. Tort law is the major "battleground of social theory" and is essentially a process of balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the public. Since common law is based on a system of precedent, under
which rules are followed for unlimited periods of time until justly overturned, there is good reason to reach desirable social results in every case.
When public interest swings the balance in favor of one party over another,
the result is a form of "social engineering" reflecting human experience. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, § 3, at 14-16 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
As crime increases so does the fear of those parties affected by crime.
Ultimately, society itself must suffer. Therefore, corrective action must be
taken because as society increasingly fails to protect its members from
crime, a corresponding loss of faith in government develops. DEWOLF,
CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 3 (1975).
4. "Victims' rights litigation" is not a topic heading used by the major
law publishers, but a term made popular by the Crime Victims Legal Advocacy Institute, Inc., and adopted by modern commentators. The term is
often used to describe a classification of cases where a crime victim-plaintiff
initiates a civil suit against the criminal or a negligent third party whose
unreasonable acts allegedly caused the victimization. Victims' Rights,
supra note 1, at 454. The general classification, however, can be divided into
three subclasses: perpetrator against victim; victim against perpetrator;
and victim against negligent third parties. Carrington, The Crime Victims
Legal Advocacy Institute: A Victims' Legal Rights Organizationis Formed

in Virginia, 6 VA. B.A.J. 4, 4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Carrington].
As the preceeding subdivision indicates, there have been occasions
where the victim of a crime has been sued for damages by the perpetrator.
This type of suit is rare and often simply an instrument of harassment used
by guilty perpetrators. See, e.g., Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(case dismissed on grounds that action was malicious or frivolous). However, when a victim makes a good faith identification of an alleged attacker
and no conviction ensues, the alleged criminal may bring an action against
the victim for false imprisonment or some other applicable tort. See, e.g.,

Shires v. Cobb, 271 Or. 769, 534 P.2d 188 (1975) (defendant made good faith
but mistaken identification of plaintiff as man who robbed her). Public pol-
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manner practically nonexistent twenty years ago.5 The new
trend involves the crime victim as civil litigant against a third
party rather than the criminal perpetrator. Plaintiffs are using
traditional negligence standards 6 innovatively in alleging that
icy considerations promoting crime reporting usually will aid the victim-defendant who in good faith mistakenly identifies his attacker. Id. at 770, 534
P.2d at 189.
Civil suits by the crime victim against the perpetrator present no special conceptual problems. Traditional common law tort remedies are readily available to the plaintiff. Even if there is no criminal conviction, a civil
suit may still be successful because of the difference in criminal and civil
burdens of proof. Carrington, supra note 4, at 6. For a summary of the distinction between a tort and a crime, see PROSSER, supra note 3, § 2, at 7-9.
Although the establishment of civil liability in victim versus perpetrator suits may be relatively easy, the suits are often ineffective due to collection problems. Most violent crimes are not committed by the wealthy.
Carrington, supra note 4, at 7. See Schultz, The Violated: A Proposal to
Compensate Victims of Violent Crime, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 238, 243 (1975). If

the perpetrator is indigent, an action for monetary redress is likely to be of
no practical consequence. Collection becomes even more problematic if the
indigent is sentenced to prison. Thus, victims began to sue more affluent
third-party defendants who allegedly were in a position to prevent the
crime. Carrington, supra note 4, at 7.
In third-party litigation, the victim elects to sue a more financially stable third party whose negligence aided the criminal, thus proximately causing the harm. Compensation in a third-party suit depends on the victim's
ability to establish a legal duty and prove that a breach thereof caused his
injuries. Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 56 Il. 2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39
(1973); Lindquist v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 40 Ill. App. 3d 722, 353
N.E.2d 156 (1976). See infra note 6. The duty to protect the victim often
arises from a special relationship between the third party and the victim or
the criminal. See infra note 19. When such a relationship is absent, duty
may be premised on the foreseeability of harm or public interest. See, e.g.,
infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. The apprehension or conviction
of the suspected criminal plays no part in the litigation. Moreover, the
third-party defendant may be either the government or a private person.
Carrington, supra note 4, at 8.
5. New Tort, supra note 2, at 40.

6. The traditional fashion of pleading a negligence cause of action is to
allege five components: (1) a duty requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks; (2) breach of that duty, or failure to conform to the required standard;
(3) breach as the actual cause of the plaintiff's injury; (4) breach as the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, i.e., a reasonably close causal link
between the defendant's breach of duty and the resulting harm to the plaintiff; and (5) actual injury or damage to the plaintiff. PROSSER, supra note 3,
§ 30, at 143. The elements of duty and proximate cause receive prime consideration by the courts because they are questions of law rather than fact.
Id. § 53, at 324. Further, the question of duty and proximate cause are
sometimes the same. Id. §§ 42, 53, at 244-45, 325-26. See Tarasoff v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 433, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22
(1976) (all persons foreseeably endangered by defendant's conduct are
owed a duty of care with respect to any risk making the conduct unreasonably dangerous). Commentators disagree on the meaning of proximate
cause. As a general rule, however, it can be said that proximate cause represents a determination that a defendant should be held legally responsible
for the consequences of his negligent act or omission. PROSSER, supra note
3, § 41, at 236. See generally L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
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the unreasonable acts 7 of the third party set the stage for the
resulting crime. Liability is predicated upon the theory that the
crime was committed against a particular victim due to the
breach of a third party's duty to protect him. The duty to provide occupants with proper building security 8 and the duty to

supervise or confine criminals properly 9 typify the protective obligations involved.
With relatively little case law available, 10 victims' rights litigators are testing courts to ascertain the bounds of third-party
liability if, for instance: a bus driver negligently allows a stranger to criminally assault a passenger; 1 a landlord negligently al-

lows building security to deteriorate and a tenant is attacked;12 a
psychologist negligently fails to warn of his patient's stated intent to harm a particular individual;' 3 or a corrections officer
negligently allows a prisoner to escape and the escapee subsequently kills someone1 4 Regardless of the specific factual setting, the result of the original negligence is the criminal
victimization of an unreasonably vulnerable plaintiff.' 5 By focusing attention on the rights of innocent victims, courts are
concerning themselves with rights once largely ignored. 16 Previ(1927); Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REV. 633
(1920); Campbell, Duty, Fault and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 402; Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreatfrom Rationalization, 6 U.

Cm. L. REV. (1938).
7. Negligence has been defined as "'conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage,' or, more fully, conduct 'which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonably great risks of harm.'" PROssER, supra note 3, § 31, at 145 (citations omitted).
8. See, e.g., Gaizilli v. Howard Johnson Motor Lodge, Inc., 419 F. Supp.
1210 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (motel owner held to owe occupant duty to provide
adequate locks on easily accessible patio doors).
9. See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260,
564 P.2d 1227 (1977) (parole board owed duty of protection to man murdered
by foreseeably dangerous parolee).
10. Carrington, supra note 4, at 4; New Tort, supra note 2, at 40.
11. Smith v. West Suburban Transit Lines, 27 Ill. App. 3d 220, 326 N.E.2d
449 (1975).
12. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
13. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
14. Taylor v. State, No. 211-130 (Super. Ct., Pierce County, Wash., Sept.
10, 1973).

15. The plaintiff is considered unreasonably vulnerable because, theoretically, circumstances have placed a significant degree of control over his
protection in the hands of another. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying
text.
16. See Donenberg, Compensationfor the Victims of Crime: Justicefor
the Victim as well as the Criminal,1970 INS. L.J. 628; Inbau, Forwardto Carrington, Victim's Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, 11 U. RICH. L.
REV. 447 (1977); Comment, Compensationfor Victims of Violent Crimes, 26
KAN. L. REV. 227 (1978) for articles alleging the legal system's lack of con-
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ously, most attention was directed toward victim compensation
through the interpretation of insurance contracts, restitution,
and state-funded compensation programs. 17 Victims, however,
are now enjoying significant success in suits against third parties for the intervening acts' 8 of criminals.
To establish liability, the victim-plaintiff usually must plead
and prove that a special relationship existed between the defendant-third party and the victim or the criminal. 19 Because
there is no general duty requiring a private person to protect
another from criminal attack, 20 courts create exceptions, often
cern with adequate victim compensation. See generally F. CARRINGTON,
THE VICTrIMS (1975). In a speech to the American Bar Assocation, Chief Justice Warren Burger called for reversal of the trend favoring the accused in
the criminal justice system. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1980, § A, at 5, col. 3.
17. See Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L.BULI.

203 (1978); Lamborn, Remediesfor the Victims of Crime, 43 S. CAI_ L. REV. 22
(1970); McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation, 8
URB. L. 346 (1976). About one-third of the states have legislation providing
for some type of compensation for the victims of crime. Comment, The Use
of Civil Liability to Aid Crime Victims, 70 J. CRIM. L. &C. 57, 57 (1979). See,
e.g., the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70,
§§ 71--90 (1973) for an example of a typical statutory program designed to
provide redress for victims who have cooperated with the police.
18. The question of intervening acts in negligence actions involves the
determination of a defendant's liability for an injury to which he has significantly contributed, when the actual harm is caused by an independent
source for which the defendant is not directly responsible. PROSSER, supra
note 3, § 44, at 270. An intervening cause is a force taking effect after the
defendant's negligence, which adds to that negligence in causing the plaintiff's injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441(l) (1965). Some intervening acts are such that they prevent a finding that the original negligence
was the proximate cause of the harm. Such intervening acts are often referred to as "superseding" because they cancel the defendant's liability. Id.
at § 440.
19. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 33, at 174. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), explaining
the role of special relationships:
As a general principle, a "defendant owes no duty of care to all persons
who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct.". . . [H] owever, when
the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to control the
conduct of another person, or to warn of such conduct, the common law
has traditionally imposed liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerousperson or to the potential victim.
Id. at 434-35, 551 P.2d at 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
20. See, e.g., Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345 Ill. App. 585, 104 N.E.2d
334 (1952) (defendant did not assume duty to protect plaintiff from being
shot by robber on defendant's premises). See also PROSSER, supra note 3,
§§ 33, 56, at 173-76, 340-41; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965):
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third
person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other
which gives to the other the right to protection.
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attaching the duty to a defendant via a relationship between the
parties. 2 1 This type of special relationship has been found to exist, for example, between a carrier and passenger, 22 an innkeeper and guest,23 an employer and employee, 24 and a landlord
25

and tenant.
The problem with victims' litigation lies in the judiciary's inconsistent recognition of the duty to protect. 26 The irregular application of the special relationship rule, the failure of courts to
announce exactly what makes a relationship special, and the
role of policy considerations in the judicial analysis of negli28
gence 27 have led to inconsistent and sometimes unjust results.
Consequently, a strain has been placed on the traditional notion
of duty in suits against third parties for the failure to protect
against the criminal acts of another.
Concurrent with the trend of increasing liability, modern
courts frequently place less emphasis on relationships and more
on policy when considering the duty to protect.29 Employment
of broadly defined public interest rationale 30 allows courts to
create exceptions to the general rule of nonliability in a wider
variety of factual settings than in the past.3 1 Tradition has not
Id.; Harper & Kline, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43

YALE

L.J. 886, 887 (1934). See generally Eldredge, Culpable Interventionas Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1937); Feezer, Intervening Crime and
Liabilityfor Negligence, 24 MINN. L. REV. 635 (1940); Annot., 10 A.L.R. 3d 619
(1966).
21.

PROSSER,

supra note 3, § 33, at 174. See Victims'Rights, supra note 1,

at 459-67 for a compilation and discussion of various special relationships.
22. E.g., Hanback v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 396 F. Supp. 80 (D. S.C.
1975).
23. E.g., Tobin v. Slutsky, 506 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1974).
24. E.g., Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947).

25. E.g., Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969).
26. Whether there is a duty to protect is a question of law. Cunis v.
Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974); Barnes v. Washington, 56 Ill. 2d
22, 305 N.E.2d 535 (1973).
27. Comment, Victims' Suits Against Government Entities and Officials
for Reckless Release, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 597 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Reckless Release]. See PROSSER, supra note 3, § 42, at 244 (imposition of
duty and proximate cause is essentially a conclusion of policy
considerations).
28. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
31. Third-party suits involving the government are a good example of
the spread of liability. Victims increasingly are finding that they can establish a cause of action against government entities for the failure to perform
a protective function properly. Reckless Release, supra note 27, at 595. This
is significant because in addition to the difficulties of proving the elements
of third-party negligence, the obstacle of sovereign immunity must be overcome in actions against the government. For a complete discussion of immunity in third-party victims suits against the government, see id. at 598-
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yet been buried, but the judiciary may be signaling that the exceptions will soon become the general rule. The reasonable man
in today's society is no longer entitled to assume automatically
that third persons will not commit crimes. Crime is considered
so predictable in certain situations that the foreseeability of its
occurrence is often used as the basis for imposing
the burden of
32
anticipating and preventing criminal acts.
Victims' rights litigation encompasses cases in which victims of crimes, usually violent crimes against the person, utilize
civil courts to recover from either the actual perpetrator or from
third parties whose negligence caused the victimization.33 The
topic under consideration in this comment does not include
criminal or civil actions against the perpetrator or such legislatively created victims' programs as restitution and state-funded
compensation. Instead, consideration will be given to the distinctive problems created by the class of cases where a plaintiff
seeks to hold a defendant-third party liable for the conscious,
willful acts of another.
THE

DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AND PREVENT CRIMINAL ACTS

Courts historically have been reluctant to hold an individual
responsible for the willful and malicious acts of others. 34 The
law of negligence, however, is based on the idea that the reasonable man occasionally is required to anticipate the conduct of
others.3 5 This is because an individual of normal experience
knows of the traits and habits of others and is expected to act
accordingly. For example, one may be required to anticipate
that a drugged person can wander unknowingly into a place of
36
danger.
Along with reasonable conduct, the prudent person is re614. Prison wardens, parole and probation boards are among the immune
executive branch officials. Some jurisdictions, however, use policy considerations to conclude that, in some circumstances, certain government entities are only entitled to limited immunity. Carrington, supra note 4, at 9.
See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons &Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267, 564
P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977) (Arizona Supreme Court held previously immune parole board officials could be sued for gross negligence in the release of dangerous criminals). But see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)
(survivors of murder victim had no right under Constitution or Civil Rights
Act to sue state parole board for gross negligence in releasing murderer).
32. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 433,
551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976) (foreseeability is the most critical factor in establishing the duty to protect).
33. Carrington, supra note 4, at 4.
34. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 33, at 173.
35. Id. at 170.
36. Id.
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37
quired to expect a certain amount of negligence from others.
People are sure to act unreasonably from time to time. In such a
case, the imposition of liability customarily has hinged upon the
weighing of the gravity of the risk involved against the utility
that would result from the burden of avoiding the risk. 38 Thus,
one may be required to anticipate the possibility of negligence
by others. Generally, this will occur only if the likelihood of injury is high or if the magnitude of the injury is substantial.
The prudent person also knows that crime is sure to occur.
Unlike the situation involving the anticipation of negligence,
however, the reasonable man normally is not required to anticipate the criminal acts of others.3 9 Therefore, limits are placed
on the possible extent of liability for the failure to anticipate the
independent criminal acts of another. In a negligence action,
the element of duty limits the type of conduct for which a defendant must account.
A duty is an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct
toward another. 4° There is no common law duty to anticipate
criminal activity.4 1 Thus, the law ordinarily does not require the
prudent person to expect the criminal activity of others.
Since duty is essentially a recognition of an obligation imposed as a response to human experience, a conflict has arisen
due to the significant increase in crime in the last four decades.
Human experience generated by modern living has revealed
that there are situations where criminal activity can be predicted with a significant degree of probability. Simultaneously,
experience also shows that the occurrence of crime is still so
unpredictable that the burden of requiring individuals to conform their conduct so as to protect all others from crime would
be too costly. As a result, the duty to protect is expressed as an
exception to the general rule.
The victim's theory in pleading for an exception is generally
that the circumstances placed control of the situation in the
hands of a third party.42 As a result, only the defendant-third
party had the power to prevent the crime. Therefore, it is in the
public's interest for the person in control to afford a reasonable
43
degree of protection to the dependent or controlled party.

37. Id. at 171.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. REV. 1225, 1225-26 (1937).
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 33, at 173.
Id. § 53, at 324.
See supra note 20.
Carrington, supra note 4, at 10.
Id.
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There is liability only if the defendant is negligent in not taking
precautions against the possible crime.4 A finding of negligence must be based on the reasonable foreseeability of the
crime and the unreasonableness of the foreseeable risk involved
as compared to the burden of guarding against the possible
45
crime.
The major problem with the current use of exceptions to the
general rule is that a universal workable basis for a duty to protect has yet to be found.4 Since a single workable approach to
duty has not been adopted by the various jurisdictions, a thirdparty victims' suit can turn on any number of factors. Among
the factors consistently emphasized by the courts are: the degree of control inherent in the relationship between the parties; 47 foreseeability; 8 the public's interest in safety from
violent assault;49 the victim's expectation and reliance on the deof the relafendant for protection; 50 and the economic aspects
51
defendant.
the
and
plaintiff
the
between
tionship
The Special Relationship Rule
A legal duty to protect must be established to recover
against a third party who did not commit the crime, but whose
negligence aided the criminal in his activities. Once duty is established, the plaintiff must prove that a breach of that duty
caused his injuries. Theoretically, liability arises because the
third party knew or should have known that his negligence was
setting the stage for a foreseeable crime.5 2 A general duty to
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 33, at 175-76.
45. Id. at 176.
46. Compare Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334,131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (public policy) with Fancil v. Q. S. E. Foods,
Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975) (special relationship) with Neering
v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943) (foreseeability).
47. E.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(landlord's exclusive power to take preventive action provides rationale for

44.

the duty to protect his tenants).

48. E.g., Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503
(knowledge leading to the reasonable anticipation of crime imposes the
duty of vigilance and the adoption of protective measures).
49. E.g., Beauchene v. Synanon Found., Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 798-99 (1979) (when considering the duty to prevent inmate es-

capes, the policy favoring rehabilitation must be balanced against public
interest in safety from assault).
50. E.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 447, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

(tenant entitled to expect landlord's maintenance of protective measures in
effect at beginning of lease and such expectations deserve legal protection).
51. E.g., id. at 488 (increased costs from providing protection will ultimately be passed from the landlord to the tenant).
52. Note, California'sApproach to Third Party Liability for Criminal
Violence, 13 Loy. LA.L. REV. 535, 545 (1980).
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protect has not evolved because of the difficulties of setting standards unselfishly to aid those in peril, 53 the inability to devise a
workable rule to cover all possible situations, 54 and the individualistic philosophy of the common law. 55 Hence, exceptions are
employed instead of establishing a general duty to protect
another.
There is generally less reason to anticipate that others will
act in an intentionally damaging rather than merely negligent
manner.5 6 There is even less reason to anticipate the criminal
acts of others.5 7 Courts historically have reasoned that even
though crimes do occur, often with a degree of predictability or
regularity, they are still so unlikely to occur in any particular
instance that the burden of continual precautions exceeds the
apparent risk.58 Thus, it is generally reasonable to risk criminal
intervention without taking precautions to prevent it.
Traditionally, courts have required a special relationship between the victim or criminal and the third party 59 to establish
the duty to protect. The special-relationship requirement
evolved from the persistent refusal of courts to recognize either
nonfeasance or any moral obligation 60 to come to the aid of the
endangered as a basis of liability. 61 A special relationship can
be recognized in circumstances where either a special responsibility for the defendant to protect the plaintiff or the defendant's
creation of some special temptation requires him to take precau53. Prosser states that a rule encompassing moral standards might un-

fairly cause innocent bystanders to be liable. Any tendency to depart from
using special relationships as the basis for the creation of a duty to aid one
in peril is limited by "the difficulties... of making any workable rule to
cover possible situations where fifty people might fail to rescue one .
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 56, at 341.
54. Id.
55. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS, § 18.6, at 1046 [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
56. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 33, at 173.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 174.
59. The special relationship can exist between the victim and the third
party, as in the case of the common carrier and its passenger. See, e.g., McCoy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 69 Ill.
2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977) (common
carrier held liable for breach of its duty to prevent an assault on a passenger by a fellow passenger). The requisite relationship can also exist between the third party and the criminal, as in cases involving employer
liability for employee activities. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Morgan,
338 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (employer is liable for criminal acts of
employees, if such acts are in the course and scope of employee's responsibilities). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-320
(1965).
60. As a result, an adult capable of saving a small child may watch the
child drown without fearing liability. HARPER &JAMES, supra note 55, § 18.6,
at 1046.
61. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 56, at 340.
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tions against foreseeable criminal activity.62 Correspondingly,
courts have identified certain classes of individuals and placed a
duty on them to protect others from criminal attack. 63 The common law rule is not rejected. Instead special relationship exceptions to the general rule precluding liability are created. These
exceptions give rise to a duty to protect another from a foreseeable risk of criminal victimization."
As a guideline, the Second Restatement of Torts has classified certain relationships as special. 65 The Restatement specifically indicates, however, that other relationships may create a
duty to protect. 66 According to the Restatement, special relationships exist between: common carrier and passenger; innkeeper and guest; possessor of land holding it open to the public
and those responding to his invitation; and a custodian and his
67
charge.
The Second Restatement of Torts uses the control aspect of
the relationship between the parties as rationale for calling the
relationship special and, consequently, finding a duty. 68 Either
the law has required69 or the victim voluntarily has placed himself under the control and protection of another. Hence, a duty
arises to protect the prospective victim from attack.
Control has been referred to as the singular justification for
labeling a relationship special. 70 The problem is that courts
have not always approached the classification of relationships
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
64. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314(a) (1965). The California
Supreme Court recently suggested that expansion of the list of special-relationship exceptions, rather than departure from the common law rule precluding liability, is the proper approach in establishing a duty to protect
another from criminal violence. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17
Cal. 3d 425, 435 n.5, 551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23.n.5 (1976).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(a) (1965).
66. Id.
67. Id. at §§ 302 B, Comment (e), 314(a), 315, 320.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) formulates this rationale by providing that one who takes custody of another under circumstances that deprive the other of his normal power of self-protection, or that
subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care in controlling the conduct of third persons so as
to prevent them from intentionally harming him.
69. For example, the law may require that an individual be put in the
custody of a prison official.
70. Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners' Liabilityfor Failureto Protect Patronsfrom CriminalAttack, 21 ARiz. L. REV.
727, 736 (1979). But see Note, California'sApproach to Third Party Liability

for Criminal Violence, 13 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 535, 551 (1980) (liability for negligence premised on duty of care arising from "professional status" of specially related party).
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by merely considering the aspect of control. 71 Another problem
with the special relationship approach to duty is that the absence of a traditionally recognized relation can arbitrarily prevent recovery 72 or lead to results that are inequitable. For
example, the common carrier-passenger relation traditionally
has been used to justify the imposition of the duty to protect. If
a carrier's negligence leads to an assault on a passenger at a
73
Sitrain station, the passenger can recover from the carrier.
multaneously, if the passenger's spouse accompanied her, not as
a fellow passenger but simply to see her off, he could be a victim
due to the lack of
of the same crime, yet be barred from recovery
74
the requisite special relationship status.
Current confusion in the landlord-tenant area is further evidence of the shortcomings of merely adding to the list of special
relations. Traditionally, landlords had no duty to protect ten75
ants from criminal harm on or around the leased premises.
The principle was uprooted, however, in 1970 by a federal court
in Kline v. 1500 MassachusettsAvenue.76 The Kline court held a
landlord liable for the assault of a tenant in a common hallway
of an apartment building. The duty to protect the tenant was
founded partially on the landlord's knowledge of repeated criminal activities on the premises. 77 Another key factor in Kline was
the landlord's control over the common areas of the building,
thus giving him the exclusive power to act in a preventive
71. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (finding of special relationship based partially on analogy between
contractual obligations of the modern landlord and the common-law era
innkeeper).
72. A guest can recover from an innkeeper, but some jurisdictions will
not recognize the creation of the same duty in the seemingly analogous relationship between a landlord and tenant. See, e.g., Trice v. Chicago Housing Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973) (duty held too vague to
impose on landlords); Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291
(1962) (unfair to hold landlord responsible for all criminal activity on
premises).
73. See, e.g., Kenny v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351
(3d Cir. 1978) (common carrier held liable for the rape of a woman on a
station platform located in an area of increasing crime).
74. E.g., Houston v. Texas Cent. R.R. v. Phillio, 96 Tex. 18, 69 S.W. 994
(1902). See also Totten v. Moore Oakland Residential Hous., 63 Cal. App. 3d
538, 546, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29, 35-36 (1976) (landlord under duty to protect tenant, but not guest of tenant).
75. See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
76. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. The Kline court emphasized the fact that the landlord had both actual and constructive notice that the building was undergoing "a rising
wave of crime." Id. at 483. Thus, the court stated that "the landlord here
was aware of conditions which created a likelihood ... that further criminal attacks upon tenants would occur." Id.
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manner.78
Conversely, in Trice v. Chicago Housing Authority79 an Illinois appellate court held that the landlord, though in control of
the premises and aware of the risk, had no duty to protect his
tenant from the criminal acts of another tenant.80 The Trice
court held that such a duty would be too vague and could result
in landlord liability for criminal harm whenever some notice of
possible harm was proved. 8 ' Thus, the special relationship approach as currently applied is unable to set forth clearly a universal or pivotal factor giving rise to the duty to protect.
Moreover, the approach is not adjustable to varying factual settings involving the same purported special relationship.
The duty arising from a special relationship requires the defendant to protect reasonably foreseeable victims from criminal
harm.8 2 Courts routinely state, without analysis, that a special
relationship creates the duty to protect another. Once the statement is made, however, some courts actually premise the duty
on other factors. For instance, in Semler v. PsychiatricInstitute
of Washington,83 a federal appellate court began its opinion by
stating that a special relationship created by a probation order
created a duty to protect.8 4 The duty required the institute to
afford a reasonable degree of protection to the public against the
risk of harm at the hands of a patient. Conversely, near the end
of the opinion, the court held that the duty was imposed "be'8 8
cause [the] danger was reasonably foreseeable.
Duty Created by Policy
Although special relationships undoubtedly have played
key roles in permitting victims' suits, it has been said that the
basic question of determining responsibility for intervening
crime is one of policy. 86 Thus, courts are free to create exceptions to nonliability based on a number of considerations other
than relationships. Principal policy considerations have been
78. Id. at 482-83.
79. 14 Ill.
App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973) (action to recover against
landlord after tenant killed by television allegedly thrown from above by
another tenant).
80. Id. at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 209-10.
81. Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).

83. 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 125.
85. Id. at 126. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 55, § 18.6, at 1046 for a

discussion of the role of foreseeability in the existence vel non of a duty.
86. Feezer, Intervening Crime and Liabilityfor Negligence, 24 MNN. L.
REV. 635, 642 (1940).
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held to include foreseeability of harm, certainty of the plaintiff's
injury, proximity of the defendant's conduct to the plaintiff's injury, moral blame, deterrence of future crime, burden on the defendant, and consequences to the community. 87 If the duty to
protect another from crime is viewed strictly from a policy
standpoint, inconsistency and ad hoc decision making will result. Exceptions to the no duty rule based on varying policy considerations do not insure that appropriate consideration is given
to traditional third party negligence standards. Courts are more
prone to agree on the results than the reasoning used to obtain
them and confusion is inevitable.
One problem is that judicially created policy considerations
are not always based on public sentiment or legislative input.88
Another difficulty lies in the unstructured use of a wide range of
factors. This can easily lead to a misinterpretation of the actual
basis of liability.8 9
The Role of Foreseeability
The practice of determining the scope of duty by foreseeability took firm root in the landmark case of Palsgrafv. Long
Island Railroad Co. 90 Palsgrafheld that if harm to the plaintiff
is foreseeable, the defendant owes him a duty of care and is liable even if the injury occurs in a peculiar fashion. Modem
courts apply the Palsgraftest not only to determine the scope,
but also the existence of a duty. 91
Just as the use of special relationships without more does
not lead to a workable rule defining duty in third-party victims'
litigation, the use of foreseeability alone does not provide a real
solution. The concept is difficult to define precisely and is subject to varying interpretations by different courts. For example,
using foreseeability as the basis of duty is notable in cases
where the theft of an automobile is facilitated when the owner
negligently leaves the keys in the ignition. This represents a re-

87. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976).
88. Note, California'sApproach to Third Party Liability for Criminal

Violence, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 535, 547 (1980).
89. Id.
90. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
91. See, e.g., Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 III. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954)
(duty founded on a statute prohibiting leaving keys in a car, due to the foreseeability of the probable consequences); Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super.
432, 294 A.2d 727 (1972) (duty imposed because leaving keys in a car overnight created special circumstances, where a motorist could or should have
foreseen the danger of theft and the gravity of potential harm).
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versal of tradition;92 courts are finding a duty to protect others
from the negligent driving of a thief when the automobile owner
could or should have foreseen
the danger of theft and the gravity
93
of the potential harm.
Foreseeability was also a critical factor in establishing the
duty to protect in Kline.94 Realizing the problems involved
when foreseeability enters into the determination of duty, the
Kline court attempted to define the requisite foresight. Kline
stated that foreseeability with respect to the criminal acts of
third parties meant more than the possibility of harm. 95 The
96
court held that the crime must be probable or predictable.
Other courts have attempted to define further this measure of
foreseeability needed to create the duty to protect,97 but distinguishing a possible from a probable crime is difficult.
Further illustration of the conceptual difficulties inherent in
a foreseeability standard to determine duty is provided by the
decision in Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark. 98 The
Goldberg court held that the owner of multi-family structures
had no duty to provide police protection for his tenants. 99 The
court reasoned that "[eIveryone can foresee the commission of
crime virtually anywhere and at any time."' 0 0 Therefore, "It] he
question whether a private party must provide protection for another is not solved by recourse to 'foreseeability.' "101 As a result, foreseeability cannot be universally used as the sole
criterion to determine duty in victims' suits against private third
parties.
Du'ry

PREMISED ON FAIRNESS

Determination of the factors relevant to the imposition of a
duty in tort law is one of the most difficult responsibilities of the
92. Traditionally, a common law duty to protect injured plaintiffs has
not been placed on car owners whose negligence facilitated the theft and
the consequent negligent driving of the thief. See, e.g., Lorang v. Heinz, 108
Ill. App. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 785 (1969) (leaving the keys in the ignition, at
most, increases the risk of theft and has no bearing on the thief's driving).
93. Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (1972).
94. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See
generally supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.

95. 439 F.2d at 483.
96. Id.

97. See, e.g., Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393,
224 N.W.2d 843, 851 (1975) ("when the landlord is informed by his tenants
that a possible dangerous condition exists in the building, he has a duty to
investigate and take available preventive measures").

98. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
99. 186 A.2d at 296.

100. 186 A.2d at 293.
101. Id.
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legal system. 10 2 Since different relationships can involve different degrees of control and risk at a given time, the solitary use of
special relationships as a basis for duty in third party victims'
suits is insufficient. Likewise, the use of foreseeability or other
policy considerations alone affords an inadequate premise for
the imposition of the duty to protect another.
One aspect of the dilemma is that courts and commentators
are eager to find one central principle upon which the imposition of the duty owed a crime victim will turn in all cases. The
goal is admirable, but, coupled with the traditional complications involved in suits against negligent third parties, the quest
to break new ground is adding to the existing confusion. Consequently, the varying approaches used in different jurisdictions,
and sometimes within the same one, 0 3 are making the possibility of uniform reasoning even more remote.
Courts consider many factors before imposing duties of care
among individuals 0 4 but, in essence, a court generally will find a
duty where reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it
exists. 10 5 If a duty is the result of reasonable recognition and
agreement, then the determination of duty in third party victims' suits should begin by recognizing what already has been
made clear there is no one pivotal principle applicable to all
situations. Instead, three factors dominate cases where a third
party has been held liable for the criminal acts of another. The
keys to liability are the defendant's control of a situation and
corresponding power to take precautions, the foreseeability of
harm, and the public's interest in the prevention of crime. The
problem is that all three factors seldom are actually considered
in the same case. The determination of duty in the context of
the victims' rights suit against a third party should be made by a
weighing of the degree of control that makes the relationship of
the parties special, the foreseeability of criminal harm, and the
public interest in creation of the duty. Thus, the existence of a
duty to protect can be viewed as a determination of the reasonableness and fairness of holding a person liable for the independent criminal acts of another.
Looking to the reasonableness or fairness of the proposed
duty was suggested in Goldberg v. Housing Authority of New102. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLuM. L. REV.
1014, 1025-26 (1928).
103. See supra note 43.
104. Administrative convenience, the capacity of the parties to withstand
the loss, the deterrence of crime, and moral blame are frequently considered. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 54, at 326-27. See generally Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928).
105. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 54, at 327.
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ark.1 06 In Goldberg a milkman, who was not a tenant, was assaulted and robbed on a common elevator. The trial court ruled
for the plaintiff based on the defendant's negligence in not supplying police protection. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower court and held that whether a duty to guard
against criminal attack exists is "ultimately a question of fairness.' 10 7 The court stated that "the inquiry involves a weighing
of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the
10 8
public interest in the proposed solution.' 1
Under the Goldberg fairness approach, it would be erroneous for a court to hold, as did the court in Kline, 0 9 that all landlords owe a duty of protection from foreseeable crime to their
tenants. The duty would arise only in situations where its existence would be fair. That courts apply the fairness approach
without specifically calling it by name can be seen in the Illinois
treatment of the landlords' obligation to protect his tenants from
criminal activities." 0 Illinois courts have placed no general duty
of protection from crime on the landlord."' Landlords, however,
have been held liable for the failure to do so under certain
112
circumstances.
In Trice v. Chicago Housing Authority 1 3 an Illinois appellate court held that a landlord did not have a duty to protect tenants from the intentional or criminally reckless acts of other
tenants or third persons. Instead, the existence of duty depends
on "the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against it, and the consequences of placing the burden
on the defendant.""14 Thus, the stated approach to the question
5
of the duty is similar to that announced in Goldberg."
106. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).

107. 186 A.2d at 293.
108. Id.
109. 439 F.2d 447 (1970). See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Stalmack, The Illinois Landlord'sObligationto Protect
Persons on His Premises Against the CriminalActivities of Third Persons,
1980 ILL. BAR. J. 668.

111. See, e.g., Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 IMI.
2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596,
598 (1979), rev'g 58

Ill.
App. 3d 1029, 374 N.E.2d 1055 (1978) ("landlord does

not owe a tenant or social guest ...a duty to protect the latter from crininal acts").
112. See, e.g., Cross v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 74 Ill.
App. 3d 921, 393 N.E.2d
580 (1979) (landlord assumed the duty by providing security guards); Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 M1.App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975) (criminal
activity eminently foreseeable direct result of the physical condition of the
premises); Mims v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 IMI.App. 2d 283, 273 N.E.2d
186 (1971) (criminal activity direct result of landlord's affirmative act).
113. 14 IlM. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973).
114. Id. at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 209.
115. Recently, Illinois extended the Goldberg fairness approach to a factual setting involving the owner of a business who holds the structure open

19821

Third Party Litigation

A close reading of Trice reveals that the holding was actually based on the overall fairness of imposing such a duty on all
landlords. 1 16 The Trice court recognized the inequity of finding
a duty based on foreseeability alone. 117 The court then considered a lessor's control over the premises and the traditional obligations associated with his retained power. 118 Trice reasoned
that the recognition of a duty to protect under the circumstances
in effect would make the landlord an insurer against the criminal acts of third persons. 119 The court also expressed its uneasiness at the prospect of imposing a duty on residential landlords
that eventually would be interpreted as one also owed by commercial and industrial landlords. 120 Finally, Trice concluded
that a "duty to protect tenants from injuries caused by criminally reckless acts would be vague in that landlords would have
no standard by which to determine21which criminally reckless
1
acts would come within this duty."
Although no specific doctrine of fairness was mentioned, the
reasoning used by Trice in precluding liability indicates the
court did so to prevent the unfairness that would otherwise have
occurred. 122 On the other hand, fairness has required that Illinois landlords account for the acts of criminals in certain situations. Consequently, Illinois courts have held, for example, that
if a landlord takes some affirmative action that sets the stage for
a crime, he can be held accountable for ensuing criminal
to the public for business purposes. In Bence v. Crowford Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 80 Ill. App. 3d 491, 400 N.E.2d 39 (1980), an action for wrongful death
and negligence was initiated against a bank for not preventing the fatal

shooting of a customer by a robber. A robber allegedly panicked and shot
the customer when the defendant failed to activate a door lock which would

have allowed the thieves to exit. The Bence court held in favor of the defendant calling Goldberg pertinent in stating that it would be unfair to impose liability on the bank owner. Id. at 495, 400 N.E.2d at 42.
116. 14 III. App. 3d 97, 100-01, 302 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1973).
117. Id. at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 209-10.
118. Id. at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 209.
119. Id. at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 210.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 101, 302 N.E.2d at 210.
122. The conclusion that Trice was based on fairness is strengthened by
the holding of another Illinois appellate court in Smith v. Chicago Hous.
App. 3d 967, 344 N.E.2d 536 (1976). In Smith a suit was brought
Auth., 36 Ill.

against a landlord for the fatal shooting of a tenant by a third party. Ruling
to affirm a lower court's application of Trice in holding for the defendant,
the Smith court noted that the condition of the building did not contribute
to the crime. Id. at 970, 344 N.E.2d at 540. The foreseeability of crime due to
numerous acts of violence in the locale was significant in Smith. In spite of
this, the court held that "[t]o impose liability ... would unjustly place

upon [the] defendant as a property owner a legal duty which is impossible
of performance." Id. (emphasis added).
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victimization. 123
The fairness approach to the determination of duty is more
workable than others currently in use because it compels the
simultaneous consideration of contemporary views on the foreseeability of crime and the public interest in preventing crime as
well as the relationship between the parties. Thus, the pitfalls
of basing duty on any one of these factors without considering
the others would be eliminated. Moreover, as evidenced by the
Illinois decisions, only the fairness doctrine can place sensible
restrictions on the extent of liability.
CONCLUSION

Rules concerning a defendant's liability for criminal acts
committed by another are currently in a state of confusion.
Courts have imposed liability by premising the duty to protect
on a variety of factors. One common theme, however, underlies
all the cases-the urgent need to clarify the law in this area.
The question of the liability of a negligent tortfeasor for damages caused in part by an intervening criminal is not one that
can be analyzed exclusively in terms of special relationships,
foreseeability, or public policy considerations. Instead all of
these factors should be weighed in every case.
With the degree of interaction that takes place in today's society, new and more complicated business and social relationships are continuously encountered. Unfortunately, not all of
the relations are pleasant. Crime is on the rise as is the resulting outcry for judicial response. In turn the elastic principles of
tort law have been stretched to account for society's reaction to
the side effects of evolving relationships.
The loosening of rules precluding liability in third party victims' suits, however, has not been controlled by a general guiding principle. As a result, the traditional negligence standards
have been distorted, rather than gradually stretched to insure
the retention of characteristics shaped by centuries of human
experience. Some courts have recognized the problem and effectively used fairness as the limiting device needed to preserve
orderly change and consistent decision making. Because it requires case by case consideration of relationships, foreseeability, and the public's interest in preventing crime, the fairness
approach to duty in third party victims' rights litigation is en123. E.g., Mires v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 IM.App. 2d 283, 273 N.E.2d
186 (1971) (leaving apartment door unlocked, unguarded and open during
inspection in tenant's absence held a failure to conform conduct to standards imposed by law).
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dorsed as a means of limiting confusion by adding conformity to
modern analysis.
Gregory A. Crouse

